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1. Introduction 
Outward foreign direct investment has been studied by multiple researchers in the last 
years, both to develop and developing countries. It is the dynamics and effects of the 
latter in the home country and the host country that has received the greatest attention. It 
is a fact, however, that these emerging countries are starting to become investors and 
they are growing at a fast rate. The trend is likely to continue growing and it is expected 
to change how we viewed the world until today. 
Of all developing economies, China is the highest investor worldwide according to data 
from the UNCTAD. Its influence in developing economies has attracted the attention of 
many scholars since the phenomena started, but little study has been done in one of the 
most important regions of the world: the European Union. The presence of BRIC 
countries has attracted a lot of interest and they are thought to have created 6% of the 
jobs in Europe in 2011, only behind Germany and the US (Ernst &Young, 2012). 
Although Brazil appears to be a greater investor in the region (table 1), China’s 
presence is becoming increasingly dominant in the last years. This is the reason why the 
issue has started to gain a greater interest in the scholar world.  
Table 1: Direct investment flows from BRIC countries in the EU-27, 2004-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Nevertheless, as many other continents, the European Union has been highly influenced 
by the financial crisis, and its direct investment declined considerably, among it that of 
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China. According to China’s Council for the Promotion of International trade (CCPIT, 
2010); Chinese investors were considering other economies that could bring them more 
advantages during this period. However, the investment growth rate has returned to 
levels prior to the crisis according to MOFCOM. Additionally, China has confirmed its 
interest in continue to invest in Europe, where opportunities emerging from the crisis 
are being taken upon by home investors. Although the amount is relatively small when 
compared to total OFDI by the country, its growth rate has been impressive and the 
trend appears to continue in the future. On the other hand, total OFDI has decreased its 
growth rate since the crisis started in 2008 (Table 2).  
Table 2: Chinese global OFDI vs. EU-27, 2004-2010 
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010, MOFCOM 
The theory that exists in order to explain the internationalization of firms and the 
patterns of OFDI has been regarded as a paradigm of industrialized firms trying to 
introduce themselves into developing countries. Nonetheless, economists cannot decide 
whether China follows or not the conventional theories. Constraining the study to a 
certain region that has not been sufficiently explored, we hope to find indicators that 
point out the suitability of existing theories to the present case. We must be aware that 
the findings of this research cannot be generalized to all Chinese OFDI, but it may help 
to understand its behavior in other developed countries as well. 
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Questions that this study tries to answer are:  
Is China following the traditional investment path that has been identified by other 
nations?  
Does China differ itself from the investment behavior of the other East Asian 
economies?   
What motivated Chinese investments in the EU-27? Has there been a change of interest 
along time? 
Is the strategy of Chinese OFDI different in the four regions of the EU-27? 
Other authors have already addressed the topic, but they have taken the continent as a 
whole, not divided it into regions. The purpose of doing so in this study is to provide a 
complete picture where the specific dynamics of the investment can be identified 
depending on where it is located. By doing this, if any pattern is identified, Europe can 
focus on its strengths in order to attract the necessary investment and undertake the right 
strategies.  
What is also of great interest in this study is the distribution of the investment by 
industry. There is a lot of discussion on what it is that China is really looking for when 
taking the decision to invest in developed countries that have a competitive advantage 
over them. Identifying the industries and categorizing them by regions will help us find 
what the main focus of China’s OFDI is.  
The analysis shows that there are three main reasons for investing in the EU-27: looking 
for new markets, looking for assets and increasing the efficiency. For each reason there 
is a particular region that is predominant. While asset-seeking MNEs are mainly present 
in Northern and Western Europe, those who seek a more efficient production in the 
region go to Eastern Europe. Finally, MNEs that are searching for new markets, 
segments and customers tend to concentrate in Western Europe but the dispersion is 
greater than for the other motivations. Depending on the industry, they tend to locate 
their operations in one part of Europe or the other.  
However, Chinese investments are not as simple as it could seem at a first glance 
because of particular characteristics. One of them is the role of the government and its 
influence over the geographical and sectorial location of the OFDI. It is necessary to 
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divide between public and private investments and see what is particular for each of 
them, such as the sectors they focus on. Public investment seems to vary greatly across 
time and is not driven by private interest but by the idea of a “national plan”. Private 
investments, on the contrary, are more in accordance with the classical FDI theory and 
will therefore need to be analyzed more in depth to discover a certain pattern.  
The study is structured as follows. The first section provides a theoretical background 
on the theories of internationalization and FDI, and an overview of previous research 
done on the subject. The following section, “Data and Methods”, will present the 
secondary data used in the study along with the methods used to reach the conclusions. 
The fourth section provides a global view on Chinese investments in the world along 
the time and on Chinese OFDI in the EU-27 as a whole to be able to understand the 
importance of the recent phenomenon subject to study. The fifth section provides a 
comparison of Chinese OFDI with that of other Eastern and Southeast Asian economies 
to see if they formulate together a theory of their own. The sixth section presents the 
most important motivators for private MNEs to go overseas and shows how China’s 
investment comply to a certain degree to the classical frameworks. The seventh section 
is completes the picture of Chinese MNEs in the EU-27, introducing the role of the 
government in public and private investments. Finally, an in-depth study of the most 
important private enterprises in the form of case studies will be shown, followed by the 
conclusions from the present analysis.  
2. Literature review and previous research 
2.1. Literature review 
2.1.1. Mainstream theories 
Economic and international business literature has recognized for a long time the 
presence of foreign direct investment and its importance for the development of both 
home and host countries. For a long time, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
was dominated by developed countries, accounting for an 88% of global OFDI in 2000 
(Table 3). This dominance of the industrialized world had the consequence of models 
and theories developed to explain the behavior of western MNEs that invested in 
developing and emerging economies (Wei, Z., 2010; Lau, Ngo & Yiu, 2010), which has 
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often been criticized in recent years with the emergence of transition and developing 
economies in the FDI field.    
Table 3: Global OFDI flows by economic groups 1970 - 2011 
Source: UNCTAD 
On one hand, we have the traditional FDI theory that has been used to explain 
investment from developed countries to develop and developing countries, and their 
applicability for developing countries have been questioned by several authors (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Rugman & Li, 2007). The difficulty in addressing traditional FDI 
theory is that many of them overlap and use elements from other theories, bringing 
confusion on the line that separates one from the other.  
According to Vasyechko (2012), theory of FDI can be classified into two parallel: the 
“theory of the firm” and the “international trade theory”. Being much related to each 
other, international trade theory refers to the general equilibrium model of world trade 
with models such as “Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson”, while the former refers more to the 
micro-level and the motivations from an individual level to expand their operations.   
The neoclassical theory, with the assumption of perfect competitive markets, developed 
the first models that shaped our understanding of how FDI worked. General equilibrium 
models were used to explain how industrialized countries with high labor costs moved 
their operations to developing countries that were more labor-intensive based. This 
approach was criticized for not showing the reality accurately, and economic theories 
moved forward to find alternative explanations.  
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It was Coase in the late 30s that developed the theory of transaction costs and inspired 
Hymer (1960) to develop a theory of FDI, where MNEs went abroad to transfer their 
know-how and modes of production. Although he provides some basic insights to FDI 
theory, it is not useful in understanding the motives of a transition economy investing in 
a developed economy that already possesses this knowledge. Buckley, Clegg, Cross, 
Liu, Voss and Zheng (2007) state that internalization takes place when there are 
imperfections in the home country’s capital markets and the benefits of operating 
outside outweighs the costs. To understand where these firms locate, we must refer to 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm or OLI framework.  
For a firm to consider becoming international and invest abroad, it must possess some 
competitive advantage (Child & Rodrigues, 2005) that will compensate for the risk of 
operating outside their home country. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm takes elements from 
previous FDI theories and identify firm’s advantages on ownership, location and 
internalization (OLI). By integrating these three elements, it is providing a more 
comprehensive explanation. Ownership refers to firms’ specific advantages (FSAs) that 
allow companies to obtain a competitive position in another country than their own. 
These ownership advantages could be managerial knowledge or unique resources. The 
startling fact is that emerging MNEs are believed not to have these ownership 
advantages that would allow them to internationalize as the industrialized countries 
have done previously (Buckley et al., 2007; Wei, 2010). Location advantages can 
emerge when “foreign countries offer superior market or production opportunities to 
those available elsewhere” (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). Finally, internalization 
advantage refers to how the firm is able to manage its knowledge, marketing, and other 
activities within the company reducing the costs they would incur on by doing so 
through the market.  
Deriving from the OLI paradigm, Dunning classified the motivation of MNEs to invest 
abroad in three:  
(1) Market – seeking motivation 
(2) Efficiency – seeking motivation 
(3) Resource – seeking motivation, that includes the strategic – asset – seeking FDI 
These three motivations have been derived from the observation of developed countries’ 
investments, and must therefore be carefully addressed for emerging economies.  
 
 
11 
 
2.1.2. Alternative theories for Chinese and emerging MNEs’ OFDI 
FDI inflows have been considered to have a positive effect on developing countries, 
even though this can be questioned for developed countries (Johnson, 2006). What 
remains to be explored is the effect that outward FDI has on developing economies as 
home countries, since it is such a recent event that the consequences can still not been 
observed. It is therefore that authors have constrained themselves to find what drives the 
decision of emerging multinational companies to allocate themselves in developed 
countries, such as Europe.  
The question post by many scholars is, how is China able to internationalize when it 
does not have any ownership advantage? This is especially important in the case of 
Chinese investments in developed countries, where the host countries have MNEs with 
superior know-how and managerial skills. 
Some studies propose that emerging economies’ MNEs are not so much asset-exploiting 
but asset-augmenting (Wei, 2010; Zhang, 2009), being even recognized in Dunning’s 
later work (Dunning, 2006). In order to better understand what the competitive 
advantages of Chinese firms are, the resource based view (RBV) is a classic model very 
much used by authors studying Chinese MNEs (Cui & Jiang, 2010; Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). The theory states that MNEs are restricted by the resources they have 
accumulated, and it is the uniqueness of those resources that allows them to compete 
internationally. The implication of emerging, and therefore Chinese, MNEs not having 
FSAs has made other authors argue that what allows them to compete in industrialized 
markets are other unique characteristics that can be country specific advantages (CSAs). 
Chinese OFDI, according to Cui and Jiang (2010), is both asset exploiting and asset 
augmenting. This means that it does not contradict completely the mainstream theory. 
The only difference is that the ownership advantages for asset exploiting are country 
specific, such as the influence of the government and the low-cost advantage because of 
the large pool of qualified labor.  
Child and Rodrigues (2005), on the other hand, defend that Chinese firms are not trying 
to seek strategic assets, but instead they try to “overcome competitive disadvantages”. 
Related to this theory we have the “springboard” perspective, which is based on 
Matthew’s (2006) latecomer theory, explaining that Chinese firms try to get strategic 
assets from mature companies in order to overcome their ownership disadvantages (Luo 
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& Tung, 2007). What the MNEs look for are more intangible assets, which are the ones 
lacking at their home market, such as brand names and technological know-how (Child 
& Rodrigues, 2005).   
It is also worth mentioning that in the latest literature there has been some intentions to 
integrate the institutional approach to the resource and OLI theorems (Alon, Child, Li & 
McIntyre, 2011; Cui & Jiang, 2010; Wei, 2010; Schüler-Zhou & Schüller, 2009; Peng, 
Wang & Jiang, 2008).  The interaction between formal and informal institutions with 
the behavior of the firm is regarded as essential to understand the behavior of emerging 
MNEs. Wei (2010) argues that home country institutions influence the amount of OFDI 
that comes into a country. In particular the degree of market imperfection is a “push” 
factor that makes Chinese companies look for investments abroad (Buckley et al., 
2007). There are also some “pull” institutional factors that can influence the 
attractiveness of investing abroad, but it is believed to be greater in developing than in 
developed countries (Wei, 2010). Institutional factors, and more in concrete the 
government, are regarded as CSAs that plays an important role when firms decide to 
invest abroad (Zhang, 2009). Lau, Ngo & Yiu, (2011) also recognize the role of 
networks as informal institutions influencing the FDI decisions of emerging economies.  
2.2. Previous research  
Research on Chinese investment in the European Union has been very limited due to the 
novelty of the phenomenon, and the lack of reliable data to use in order to draw any 
conclusion. Chinese applicability to Dunning’s framework has not been explored to a 
great extent, but there are some studies that have revealed deficiencies in the 
mainstream theory (Alon et al., 2011; Cui & Jiang, 2010; Wei, 2010; Ning, 2009; 
Schüler – Zhou & Schüller, 2009; Sutherland, 2009; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Deng, 
2007; Rugman & Li, 2007). This research has been even scarcer in the academic area, 
as it was mentioned before. However, some progress has been made on the topic that 
are worth mentioning in this study and that will serve as a base for the present 
exploratory research.  
Although not an academic paper, Ernst and Young’s “European attractiveness survey” 
of 2012 revealed that Europe was the primary destination of OFDI in 2011, growing a 
22% from 2010. This remarks the importance of the region for Chinese investors, 
despite the crisis’ effect on global investments. Nevertheless, some authors (Nicolas 
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2009; Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008) point out that the proportion of Chinese OFDI in 
Europe is very small compared to its global OFDI. What remains unknown and is still 
being studied is which are the reasons behind China’s increased interest in Europe.  
Depending on the study chosen, one can find indications of a greater or lesser weight of 
the government in the process of China’s MNEs’ internationalization. Nicolas (2009) 
considers that Chinese ODI has been exaggerated in other studies. Similar to Nicolas 
and Hanemann & Rosen (2012) find Chinese investment boom in Europe to be more 
driven by commercial motives. However, there are other analyses that suggest that the 
presence of the government in Chinese investments in Europe is still present when 
undertaking decisions of where and in what to invest. Clegg and Voss (2012), for 
example, state that “Chinese central government’s practice of prioritizing its firms’ 
outward investment through the use of, inter alia, economic cooperation and trade zones 
(in the EU)”. Nicolas & Thomsen. (2008) also takes the same position explaining that 
private enterprises in Europe and in other locations may be crowded out by the big 
SOEs favored by the government, although the latter are becoming increasingly less 
political with the opening and decentralization process of China. The reduction of the 
cost of capital enjoyed by government favored enterprises is another FSA that is 
embedded in the country’s characteristics and help them to succeed both in Europe and 
abroad (Buckley et al., 2007). In figure 1 we have a comprehensive picture of how 
China’s policy system fostered by the government is affecting OFDI both in Europe and 
around the world. It does not limit itself to encourage OFDI, but it also monitors it once 
the investment has been made.  
 
 
14 
 
Figure 1: Chinese policy system of FDI  
 Source: Nicolas & Thomsen (2008), figure reproduced from Cheng and Zhou (2007) 
Concerning the motivation of investments, Buckley et al. (2007) found a significant 
relationship between the size of the country’s GDP and Chinese OFDI in developed 
regions of the world. This is pointing out towards a market-seeking strategy, which has 
also been supported by Nicolas (2009) and Rios-Morales & Brennan (2010).  Asset-
seeking motivation has been broadly discussed and it is believed to be the major 
determinant for Chinese investors to go abroad and enter developed nations. However, 
not all authors agree on the position that this determinant occupies when Chinese take 
the decision. Although Buckley et al. (2007) find that asset-seeking purposes have no 
significance in their analysis; they recognize that it will probably increase its importance 
in the following years as the “go-global” policy becomes more integrated and its impact 
starts to be felt. Later studies have, thereafter, given importance to this motivation in 
developed countries (Nicolas, 2009; Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008; Rios Morales & 
Brennan, 2010; Minin, Zhang & Gammeltoft, 2012). Efficiency-seeking as a motivation 
has not received that much attention in the literature since it is believed that China 
possess a competitive advantage with low-wage and qualified labor that they do not 
need to look for when investing in foreign countries. Only Rios-Morales and Brennan 
(2010) and Buckley et al. (2007) give importance to this determinant in developed 
countries.  
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It should not be forgotten in the literature, although it will not be explored in the present 
research, that some recent studies have started to give importance to the existence of 
Chinese networks as a firm competitive advantage that distinguish Chinese investments 
from other emerging and industrialized countries’ FDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Rios-
Morales & Brennan, 2010). 
3. Data and methods 
This is an exploratory research with a quantitative focus. Being a recent phenomenon, it 
is necessary to explore previous research done on the topic and on similar countries in 
order to provide a comparison. Descriptive statistics are used to explain whether 
Chinese investments in Europe are following the classical theory of FDI or if there are 
certain characteristics that don’t fit. In order to do so, a comparison of China’s 
investments in Europe in relation to the world will be given to provide an understanding 
of how investments in the EU-27 differ from other countries.  
A further study of Chinese investments in the EU-27 is also presented, and the region is 
divided into four sub-categories that are believed to share common characteristics both 
in political and economic structure. The division follows Eurostat’s classification of the 
EU-27 countries and the UN’s territorial division with some changes made by the 
author in order to group them as heterogeneously possible. The division is the 
following: Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), 
Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK), Southern Europe 
(Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain, and Portugal), and Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Along the thesis, some data is 
missing for certain countries in each category, and are therefore withdrawn from the 
sample. However, it is not believed to bias the results.  
In the fifth section, a comparison with other New Industrialized Economies (NIEs) is 
given in order to understand if China has the same characteristics as the rest of the 
Southeast and East Asian economies that started to industrialize some decades ahead. 
Secondary data from previous studies is used and compiled, but is given a new 
perspective when compared to Chinese investments, something not studied in an 
extensive way until today. By following the development and geographical and sectorial 
distribution of the other economies, a conclusion can be withdrawn.  
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Continuing the previous section follows an analysis of Dunning’s framework. Since this 
is the framework that is believed to be most complete, statistical and quantitative 
secondary data is used to get an understanding about the motivations behind Chinese 
MNEs investments in relation to this framework. Data from annual surveys from 
China’s Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), in cooperation with 
the European Commission and UNCTAD, are used. These surveys are undertaken since 
2008, and they are composed by mainly privately-owned enterprises from different 
sectors across the economy in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding. In 
this study, the survey from April 2010 and April 2011 will be used. The second survey, 
however, uses data from 2008 to 2010.  
The seventh section consists on analyzing a particular element of Chinese OFDI: the 
role of the government. Since an analysis of Chinese overseas investments cannot be 
understood without explaining the role of government-controlled institutions and 
MNEs, secondary data is displayed in order to illustrate its influence in the country’s 
OFDI. Following comes and analysis of the most influential Chinese private MNEs that 
have invested in the EU-27 in the last decade to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
motivations of the enterprises. The data collected is also secondary, with official figures 
from the enterprises’ homepages and annual reports.  
Finally, a conclusion will be drawn and it will be discussed whether Chinese OFDI 
offers any particularities which can make economists rethink the traditional FDI theory. 
However, our analysis does not only answer this question, but also tries to forecast what 
could be the consequences of this inflow of Chinese investments for the EU-27. The 
aim of the research is to open discussion on such a controversial topic which is 
relatively recent and offers a base for further investigation.  
4. Chinese OFDI statistics  
4.1. Chinese investments in a global perspective 
The growth of China’s economy has always been cited as miraculous between experts 
and the media. It maintained a growth rate of above 10% for five consecutive years, and 
although it has slowed down in the recent period it is still growing faster than the 
developed world. Although exports are believed to be its main driver for GDP growth, 
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the truth is that investment has always played a big role as part of the growth engine 
(Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Composition of China’s GDP growth, 1980-2010 
 Source: The Economist, 2012 from CEIC 
When China opened itself up after 1978, managerial and technological know-how was 
brought into the country, contributing to fuel growth and to improve the production 
process. After it entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), it became the second 
largest recipient of FDI behind the US. Still today it is considered as a top destination 
country by companies and individuals according to the survey undertaken by the World 
Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2012).  
What we are observing at the moment is, nonetheless, a change of direction in China’s 
growth path. Outward direct investment is starting to rise, and the trend is expected to 
continue in years to come (OECD, 2008). This new feature of Chinese growth goes 
along with Dunning’s investment development path (IDP), a theoretical framework 
where a relationship between an economy’s level of development and its outward 
investment is established. As the economy develops, structural changes take place in the 
economy affecting inward and outward investment (Fonseca, Mendonça & Passos, 
2007). The theorem proposes five stages where countries move from just receiving 
inward investments to basically only outward FDI.  
Although it is not clear in which step of the theorem China is lying, we could argue that 
it lays between stages three and four. The country has already been in stage three for 
some time, where OFDI has started but inward FDI has been predominant, giving some 
specific advantages to its home based firms through spillovers such as management and 
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technological know-how. Stage four, nevertheless, begins when OFDI is being triggered 
and has surpassed inward FDI. This particular event has not taken place in China, but it 
can be assumed to happen in the near future if its investments continue to grow at a 
130% as it has done during the period of 2004-2008 (Hanemann & Rosen, 2012). If we 
look at the official data, we can observe that China’s OFDI is catching up with a 
declining inward FDI (Table 4). 
Table 4: China’s inward vs. outward FDI, 1982-2011 
 Source: UNCTAD 
This growth rate is very unusual and impressive, even if it is compared to the start of the 
new industrialized countries at the beginning of the 1980s. Although many authors think 
that, in relation to China’s GDP and GDP per capita, OFDI plays a small role in the 
country’s development and it should be more than the figures are showing (Nicolas & 
Thomsen, 2008), we must try to not compare it to the world’s volume of outward 
investment but at the progress China has made since its liberalization in the 1970s 
(Figure 3). What today represents 4% of global OFDI; in 2020 could be among the 
world’s most important investors.  
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Figure 3: China’s ODI and cross-border acquisitions, 1982-2006 
 
Source: Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008 
When China decided to go abroad and invest, it was due to the desire to foster exports 
and hence, the economic growth of the country in the mid-80s. The main overseas 
investors, according to Hanemann & Rosen (2012), were government agencies such as 
the China Ocean Shipping Corporation (COSCO) and the China Merchandise Group. 
The motives of these institutions to go abroad were driven by government decisions, but 
also due to commercial motives: facilitate exports, pillar of the Chinese economic 
model. However, with time, China understood that it lacked some of the key ingredients 
to be as successful as more advanced economies: technological know-how. An 
additional problem did also arise and was tried to be overcome through imports: access 
to raw materials. In order to explore new markets and get access to these resources, 
China decided to expand further its overseas investments (Hanemann & Rosen, 2012).  
The real impact, however, was realized in the beginning of the 20
th
 century with the 
establishment of the “go-global policy”. It was a national plan that was established in 
1999 and became part of the 10
th
 Five Year Plan (2001-2005), giving it great 
importance. The main idea was to facilitate the process for Chinese enterprises to invest 
abroad. This was done by decentralizing the foreign currency approval of investments 
under US$ 1 million or less from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
 
 
20 
 
to local authorities. The approval from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in order 
to undertake any oversea investment was also decentralized to local commercial 
administrations, unless they were large state-owned companies. The policy also 
established a list of preferred investment industries and provided incentives such as 
grants, tax benefits, easy access loans and foreign exchange (Gu & Reed, 2013). The 
influence of the government is still felt in the amount of deals and in their economic 
value, but private enterprises have a greater advantage than in previous years because 
their oversea expansion, especially when aligned with industries the government is 
interested in, has been encouraged.   
At the moment, with a strong Reminbi that makes acquisitions cheaper and the 
accumulation of reserves, outward direct investment seems like a good option for 
China. Taking a look at the economic structure of the Asian giant, it is not surprising 
that investment to developed countries has started to take place in recent years, despite 
the greater affluence to developing nations such as Africa or Latin America (Table 5). 
Table 5: BRICs composition of GDP, 2011 
  Source: World Bank database 
A comparison with other BRIC countries has been taken due to a more similar 
economic structure. China is the country with a higher percentage of industrial activities 
contributing to its GDP, and the lower percentage of services being represented. This 
means that, in order for a structural change to happen, China must shift its focus on 
manufacturing and develop its service sector. Although this change can be made 
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endogenously with a greater foster of innovation and education in the tertiary sector, the 
process is much faster when investing abroad in countries that already possess these 
advantages and China can beneficiate from spillovers as it has done previously with 
inward FDI. Motivations to invest abroad will be influenced by the economic structure 
of the country, particularly FDI fostered by the government.  
It is also of great interest to observe in which industries China has been investing in the 
last years around the world (Table 6). We can observe that activities from the primary 
sector such as fishing, forestry, agriculture, husbandry and manufacturing have declined 
progressively. The production and supply of electricity, gas and water does not take a 
large portion of the investments, but it has remained relatively stable across time. 
Investments in manufacturing have also decreased since the beginning of the century, 
revealing a move away from the secondary sector. This indicator is surprising, since 
most industrialized countries engaged in OFDI with a heavy concentration on 
manufacturing. However, China is one of the countries with lower labor costs and 
higher labor productivity, so the theory of cost reduction does not seem to apply. 
Finally, and this may be surprising, the tertiary sector is the one that has grown most in 
percentage terms. These investments are probably targeted towards developed countries, 
where China can benefit from the existing knowledge and hence upgrade this sector in 
the home market thereafter.  
Table 6: Distribution of total Chinese OFDI by industries, 2004, 2007 and 2010 
Source: China’s Annual Bulletin 2010, MOFCOM 
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4.2. Chinese investments in Europe  
We have showed enough evidence in the previous section to support the idea that China 
is entering a new stage of growth where it is becoming truly international. Although its 
presence is predominant in Asian countries, what is called south-south investment, the 
developed world is becoming strategically more important in order for China to be able 
to compete internationally with the big players.  
According to official data provided by China’s Minister of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
annual bulletin of OFDI, Europe has been one of the regions that have grown the most 
in OFDI flows. In just two years, the amount of flows grew from a 6% in 2008 to a 10% 
in 2010 (Table 7). The crisis diminished the flows of China towards developing 
countries, reducing Europe’s amount to a 1% of its total OFDI. Nevertheless, the levels 
have returned or even increased despite the critical situation in the Eurozone. It is 
remarkable that Europe has been the only region where China has increased its OFDI 
flows after the crisis, the rest have either maintained the same volume or it has been 
reduced in favor of Asia. 
Table 7: Chinese OFDI flows by regions as a % of total OFDI flows, 2007 and 2010 
Source: Done by the author with data from MOFCOM; Statistical Bulletin of China’s 
OFDI (2010) 
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What is most remarkable in the sectorial graph is the reduction of investment flows 
towards developing economies such as Latin America and Africa, those that have been 
regarded as the main FDI destination in recent years. Such indications makes it even 
more evident that Chinese investments does not allocate its FDI in markets where they 
could benefit from ownership advantages (Dunning, 2006).  
From the previous section we could argue that China has created a greater interest in 
investing into sectors that are more predominant in developed regions, so it is expected 
for the latter to receive the same amount of Chinese FDI. Nevertheless, in the previous 
graph we could observe that this was not the case. An analysis of the value of the 
investments made in the EU-27 and the US has been made by Rhodium Group, and the 
results confirm the fact that Europe is gaining China’s interest in overall compared to 
the world’s superpower (Figure 4). Both countries started with a similar amount of 
investment from China, with a change in the receiver with higher value. However, after 
2010 there was a clear change in the pattern of Chinese OFDI and the EU-27 became 
more attractive than the US. The increase was from less than $4 billion in 2010 to over 
$10 billion in 2011 and 2012.  
Figure 4: Chinese OFDI in the EU-27 vs. the US, 2000-2012 
Source: Rhodium Group, Hanemann, 2013
1
 
                                                          
1
 The data has been collected from official figures and been composed by Rhodium Group. For further 
details, the collection of data is explained in the appendix of Hanemann & Rosen (2012) 
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These numbers indicate that China is starting to build a new type of relationship with 
the developed world; especially with Europe which has had a one-way relationship with 
China until very recently. Investment flew in large volumes to China from the EU-27 in 
2007 after experiencing a downturn during the crisis. Volumes went from €480,892 in 
2010 million to €652,062 million in 2011, according to official data2, while inward FDI 
from China did not stop to grow since the crisis started. This could indicate that China is 
starting to build a different relationship with its trading partner. What we may ask us 
after these indicators is why Europe.  
Overseas investments by Chinese enterprises have not been numerous before the 
beginning of the 12st century, especially in Europe. This makes it complicated to 
provide a comparison over time of the motives that have driven Chinese firms to invest 
in this part of the developed world. The China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT) carries out a survey based on questionnaires since 2008 
(Figure 5), where they try to gather information about the overseas operations of firms 
across China. According to the survey undertaken in 2011, only 2% of the respondents 
had commenced their investments previous to 1996-2000, before the Go-global policy 
took place. After that period, the number increased to a 69% after 2006. This indicates 
how recent this phenomenon is in the FDI theory and for empirical analysis.   
Figure 5: Experiences in Overseas Investment by Chinese firms  
Source: CCPIT, 2011 
 
                                                          
2
 Eurostat database, “EU direct investment flows, breakdown by partner country and economic activity” 
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It is important to understand that the EU-27, although one economic and political 
power, is not equal geographically and it has different characteristics across regions 
(Table 8). Due to that reason, the EU-27 is divided and the volume of FDI stocks that 
goes individually to each region is analyzed so that different conclusions can be 
withdrawn.  The difference is very large between countries, and it broadens with time. 
Unfortunately, there is not enough available data to analyze how FDI has evolved 
previous to 2004, but this range of time is considered enough to deliver some analytical 
results. During the crisis, OFDI stock in Europe rose very little or diminished, but since 
2008 it has grown at a rapid rate, especially that of Western Europe. Northern Europe 
has started to catch up with Western Europe and receives investments with higher value 
than that of Eastern and Southern Europe.   
Table 8: Chinese OFDI stock in the EU-27, 2004-2010 
Source: Author’s calculations using MOFCOM (2010) 
In order to have a more complete view of Chinese investments in Europe, we will look 
at the sectors they are investing in. The investments that are recorded in table 8 are from 
2006 to 2012, the period when most Chinese investments took place. The criteria for 
choosing the investments are those that are over 100 million USD and within the EU-
27. Although there are many small scale investments that make up for most part of the 
total investment, it is the large investments from truly global MNEs that have been 
recorded and have a greater influence on the pattern of Chinese OFDI.  
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The sectors with the highest investments in monetary value, according to data from 
Rhodium Group, are: Fossil fuels and chemicals, transportation and consumer products. 
Electronics and IT follows thereafter, but it is significantly lower. This indicates the 
importance that Chinese investors still give to raw materials, although the economic 
value does not imply that the number of deals is greater, as we will observe in following 
sections. The most interesting analysis, however, is the distribution of these investments 
across the EU-27. Western Europe is still the predominant region when investing in any 
of the economic sectors that are represented in table 9. Only Southern Europe in 
Logistics and Northern Europe in Transportation receive greater investment than 
Western Europe.    
Table 9: Sectorial distribution of Chinese investments in the EU-27, 2000-2011 
Source: Author’s own calculations using data from Rhodium Group 
Service sectors, however, do not receive a high value of FDI when compared to the 
total. Although it has increased, its impact is not as great as the rest of the traditional 
primary and secondary sectors. We should not, however, draw any conclusions from it 
since investments with smaller economic value driven by private firms may be more 
numerous than those of government-controlled MNEs. This indicates a strong presence 
of the Chinese government in the EU-27 investment that could give us a misleading 
idea of the intentions of the new private firms entering the region. Such a predominance 
of the government is not contemplated in classical FDI theory, where only private 
interests are taken into account when going abroad. Other emerging Asian countries 
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were identified to have such a presence of the state in their OFDI, thus in the next 
section we will analyze how well China ascribes to their model of FDI.  
5. Comparing China with other East Asian countries 
The deviation from traditional theory was already discussed in the 1980s and 1990s by 
many authors focusing on the “second wave” of investors, that of the East Asian 
countries (Dunning, Hoesel & Narula, 1997; Gao, 2005).  It is commonly believed that 
the MNEs from East Asian countries did not possess any of the ownership advantages 
that were needed to start investing abroad, but their advantage was based on location 
and therefore started to invest in countries that were similar to them in terms of 
economic structure (Dunning, Hoesel & Narula, 1997). Some of the Asian tigers, such 
as Taiwan and South Korea, started to invest in order to expand their markets and find 
some resources. It is interesting to note, though, that most of these investments remain 
concentrated in Southeast Asia during the first phase and did not start to increase in 
developed countries until the late 80s (Figure 6). The surge of Taiwan’s and Korea’s 
OFDI in the 80s is due to the appreciation of the Japanese Yan which, after the Plaza 
Accord negotiation that took place in 1985, grew in value so that the surplus in its 
Balance of Payment created would be mitigated (Thorbecke & Salike, 2011). The effect 
was massive investments in Taiwan, Korea and other developing Southeast Asian 
countries that changed the economic structure of all Asian economies. This change is 
explained in the famous “flying geese” model, in which Japan moved all its labor-
intensive industry to other East Asian countries that could grow and follow the same 
pattern as Japan. It is therefore we can see in figure 6 that in 1988 OFDI grew as a result 
from the growing economy that resulted from massive capital investments in these 
NIEs. 
Figure 6: Distribution of OFDI stock from Taiwan and South Korea during different 
investment stages 
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Source: Dunning, Hoesel & Narula, 1997 
This pattern is in accordance with traditional theories, which state than until the 
companies have the necessary advantages they cannot invest in certain countries. The 
success of these economies in recent years lies on the capacity of the government to 
implement policies that could leverage the ownership advantages the multinationals 
from these countries had in order to become global players. Therefore, we must give 
importance to the role of the government in the investment pattern of East Asian 
countries. In Taiwan and South Korea, for example, the government protected certain 
industries considering them as “strategic” so that they could be developed further 
(Wang, 2002). In China, the role of the government can also be felt with even more 
predominance, especially in the first period, choosing determined industries and 
companies to promote only the “giants”. The role of the government in promoting OFDI 
is a characteristic that China shares with other NIEs. 
While Japan started its overseas expansion in the 1950s and Taiwan and South Korea 
did so in the 1960s, China did not take off its overseas investments until late 1970s. The 
motivations of its investments follow a similar path to that of the other East Asian 
miraculous economies, moving from resource seeking to market seeking and finally to 
asset seeking (Wang, 2002). However, the difference does not lie on the motivations but 
on the geographical concentration of these investments. While the majority of the 
developing Asian economies concentrate their FDI in developing countries (table 10), 
China follows a different pattern. 
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Table 10: FDI from selected Asian economies, 1997 
Geographical 
destination/FDI 
source 
South 
Korea 
Taiwan Singapore Malaysia Thailand 
Developed 
economies 
43% 28% 26% 42% 26% 
Developing 
economies 
53% 53% 52% 53% 73% 
 Source: Gao, 2005. Shares for developed and developing countries do not sum up to 1 
due to an “unspecified FDI” item. 
According to Wang (2002), China industrial investments from the 1970s till 1990s were 
concentrated in developed countries where they could obtain most of the resources. 
Oceania and the US accounted for most of the FDI (59, 3%), although Canada became 
the largest FDI destination of Chinese investors in the mid-1990s (22, 7%). This 
location was due to the large amount of resources offered by the big developed 
economies. Indeed, this is remarkable taking into account that Chinese MNEs did not 
possess any advantages that could help them go abroad. The role of the government and 
the state has been crucial for these investments to happen, and the circumstances of lack 
of resources in a country that was growing faster than any other nation shaped the 
direction of the investments.  
China did not only diverge from the path of other NIEs in relation to the concentration 
in developed countries, but also in its investment in the EU-27. For the sake of 
comparison, we have taken the three earliest NIEs and China from 2008 till 2011 and 
evaluated the value of the investments in the region (Table 11). China is, by far, the 
Asian nation with the greatest interest on the developed region, while the other are 
decreasing their investment or remaining relatively stable. The surprising fact is that 
Japan, Taiwan and Korea are considered more developed than China and therefore 
possessing greater ownership advantages, but invest less on such a developed region. 
The greater interest of China in the EU-27 may indicate a higher focus on an aggressive 
asset-seeking FDI due to its latecomer position when compared to the rest of the NIEs. 
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Table 11: FDI in the EU-27 by selected Asian NIEs, 2008-2011 
Source: Eurostat database 
It is not only noticeable the different amount of investment from other NIEs compared 
to China, but also the sectors they are investing in. In the table below (table 12) we 
compare Taiwan and Korea in 1997, when they were in a similar OFDI stage as China 
is today. Both give special importance to the manufacturing sector in the EU, which 
might be surprising at first. However, these investments have been made primarily in 
Eastern Europe where there is access to the EU market but wages are still lower, very 
important in economies where the labor costs have increased continuously (Dunning, 
Hoesel & Narula, 1997). They don’t, however, invest in the primary sector as China has 
been doing in the EU-27. The banking and insurance sector, belonging to the service 
sector, received some interest from Taiwan although it still remained low.  
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Table 12: Sectorial distribution of FDI investments in Europe from South Korea and Taiwan, 
1997 
Industry/FDI source Taiwan  South Korea 
Mining 0% 4,6% 
Agriculture & Forestry 0% 0% 
Fishery 0% 0,2% 
Manufacturing 58,2% 51,4% 
Construction 0% 0% 
Transportation 0% 0,1% 
Trade  12% 41,6% 
Real Estate 0% 0,6% 
Banking & Insurance 14,7% 0% 
Others 15% 1,3% 
Source: Author’s composition using data from Dunning, Hoesel & Narula, 1997 
China appears to follow a similar pattern to that of other NIEs in the importance of the 
government when controlling and directing OFDI, facilitating the investment of MNEs 
without specific advantages as the theory states. However, the influence of the state is 
much stronger in the Asian giant, and it has targeted developed countries much faster 
than its neighbors. An aggressive targeting in order to upgrade its economy is also 
fostered by the government according to the “national plan”, which may be an 
explanation for the increase of FDI in the EU-27 when compared to other NIEs.  
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6. Chinese investments in the EU-27 complying with the classical 
theory 
Prior to the introduction of the “go global” policy, Chinese OFDI in the EU-27 was not 
collected in large quantities and it is therefore difficult to study the real determinants. 
Nevertheless, the heavy presence of SOEs and the high restrictions for companies 
desiring to expand (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2008) indicates that the motives were not 
complying with the classical theory. It was the state that dictated where to invest and the 
amount of these investments, without considering individual preferences and regardless 
of the capacity of Chinese MNEs to internationalize. According to Nicolas & Thomsen 
(2008) asset-seeking motivations were behind the national interest, and there was a 
desire to establish political influence. In the last years, however, the elimination of 
restrictions indicates a movement towards commercial motives.   
 In previous sections the amount of Chinese OFDI stock in each region and in which 
industries there is a greater interest in was already looked into.  In the present chapter, 
an understanding of which are the factors that cause these investments and which region 
of the EU-27 is more suitable for them will be given. In order to have a framework, we 
will use Dunning’s theory and search for factors that are related to the main FDI-
motivations: asset, market and efficiency seeking. Resource-seeking motivations, 
although present in China’s OFDI in the EU-27, are not regarded as being the most 
important (Clegg and Voss, 2012) and as we have seen previously they do so not in 
accordance to commercial purposes but because of government influence. Therefore, 
this motivation will not be subject to an analysis in this section.  
When deciding to invest abroad, there are a series of factors that influence that decision: 
push and pull factors. The first one refers to cyclical and structural conditions that exist 
in the home market and influences the decision of investors. The latter refers to a set of 
conditions in the host country that attracts firms to invest there because they are more 
favorable than in the home country. They can be economic, political or social reasons. 
When Chinese are motivated by different reasons to invest in Europe, there are a set of 
pull and push factors inside these categories that trigger this decision.  
The geographic distribution of Chinese OFDI has changed over time and with it the 
motivations behind. This is illustrated on surveys done by different authors and 
international organizations that try to study this phenomenon. The questionnaire 
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developed by Yao and He in 2005 reveals that companies in the European Union are 
interested mainly in searching for new markets (93%) and, second, acquiring strategic 
assets (76%) that can give them competitive advantage in order to compete globally. 
The third is the efficiency seeking motivation, although the amount of respondents 
giving importance to this factor is just a 55%, much smaller than for the previous pull 
factors. This evidence corroborates findings of Buckley et al. (2007), who found that 
market-seeking motivations were the most important ones for Chinese investments in 
developed countries.  
The motives have, however, changed over time with the political evolution that has 
taken place in China over the last years. It is therefore that the questionnaire developed 
by the CCPIT (Figure 7) gave much more importance to the asset-seeking motivation 
than to the market-seeking motivation. The “go global” policy changed the focus on 
OFDI directed to trade towards the upgrade of the Chinese brands and MNEs. This is 
why the most predominant feature in the asset-seeking motivation is the search for 
world-known brands and the desire to acquire advanced technologies and management 
expertise. Looking for resources is also mentioned as an important factor due to the 
large representation of government-controlled enterprises in the survey.   
Figure 7: Purpose of investing in the EU 
Source: CCPIT, 2011 
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According to these surveys, China is not that different from other investing nations. 
How well does the EU-27 ascribe to these motivations? And, where in the EU-27 
should Chinese MNEs look? In this analysis Chinese OFDI within each motivation will 
be looked into.  
6.1. Market-seeking 
The reason of investing in foreign markets could be propelled by the desire to have 
access to larger markets, or to a certain customer segment that is not available in the 
home country. It could also be that MNEs want to be near the customers in order to 
adapt their products or reduce the costs of serving a market from the distance (Franco, 
Rentocchini & Marzetti, 2008). It is not necessary for the MNE to allocate all of its 
production in the host country, but it can just establish part of its value chain that it 
considers will bring them a greater advantage. Although not indicated in the CCPIT 
survey, market-seeking has been mentioned by previous studies on Chinese motives in 
developed countries to be one of the main determinants for MNEs to go abroad. A 
survey, also made to discover the pattern of Chinese investment s by the consulting 
company Ernst and Young (2011), revealed that access to new customers and the desire 
to boost sales was as important, or even more, than access to technologies.  
It is in our interest to study which areas of the EU-27 could be more attractive for China 
to follow a market-seeking approach. To have an approximation of the purchasing 
power of consumers in different regions of Europe, GDP per capita was calculated for 
all EU-27 countries as it is accepted in most studies to be a reasonable measure for the 
purchasing power of countries (Buckley et al., 2007). As it can be observed in the graph 
below (Table 13), the value is higher in Western and Northern Europe. These are 
probably greater targets of Chinese investments with those expectations than countries 
in the South or the East. The chances of increasing sales in countries with higher 
purchasing power are greater, although they must compete with other western firms. An 
interesting way of being able to compete with other giants is the focus on specific 
niches of the developed market in order to gain costumers that have not been targeted 
before but where there is potential to grow, strategy used by the Chinese multinational 
Haier when moving into the U.S. Whether this hypothesis is correct or not will be 
proven when analyzing individual cases of firms.  
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Table 13: GDP per capita in the EU-27 by region, 2004-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations using World Bank Indicators  
Looking to expand the market is more likely in developing countries, where Chinese 
MNEs do possess a first-mover advantage and can transfer some of their knowledge and 
use their competitive advantage to exploit the market. Emerging economies that follow 
a market-seeking strategy in developed countries have a great disadvantage from the 
beginning, and must thereafter possess specific advantages that can allow them to enter 
or provides an advantage for the host country’s MNE. 
 For China, parenting with a strong European brand gives them the possibility to use the 
sale knowledge of the western brand and combine it with the home firm’s knowledge of 
the Chinese market, which is one of the fastest growing in the world, offering this way a 
possibility for the western MNE as well as expand its market. It is therefore possible to 
argue that CSAs of Chinese MNE give them the possibility to expand their market in 
Europe. It is not FSAs that allow them to compete, but the knowledge and access to the 
fastest growing developing market.  
6.2. Asset-seeking 
The asset-seeking motivation is two folded: asset-exploitation and asset-augmentation. 
The former refers to adapting the technological knowledge the company possess to the 
local circumstances, and the latter refers to the “exploration of a firm’s technologies 
through access to overseas technologies and know-how” (Minin, Zhang & Gammeltoft,, 
2012). Although it was first introduced in Dunning’s framework as a way of entering 
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the market by using the already existing technological knowledge of the firm, Matthew 
changed the concept and explained that newly industrialized enterprises (NIEs), by 
decentralizing its R&D, can tap into new technological know-how when they locate 
close to foreign knowledge bases (Minin, Zhang & Gammeltoft, 2012).  
China has never been strong on the innovative field but on the low-cost labor, which 
allowed them to produce cheaper than other regions. In recent years, however, the 
Chinese government has expressed its intention of boosting the role of innovation in the 
country to counteract the decrease in exports since the crisis started (Gavin, B., 2012). 
The expenditure on R&D in China rose from 0, 8% in 2000 to 1, 75% in 2010, and 
MNEs are behind most of this growth (Fabre & Grumbach, 2012). Although these 
efforts have opened the opportunity for China to catch up with more developed 
countries such as the US and Europe, the country is still not perceived as an innovation 
hub and companies lack this key advantage. Therefore, an “artificial” growth by the 
acquisition of technologically advanced European firms is the fastest way to climb the 
ladder.  
In the graph below we compare the percentage of GDP that goes into R&D among 
international companies (table 14), comparing the four different regions of the EU-27 
with that of China in order to establish which regions would attract more firms with 
these motivations. It is interesting to notice that China lies ahead of both Southern and 
Eastern Europe in recent years, but lies far behind Western Europe and especially 
Northern Europe. It will therefore be those regions where most of the investments for 
technology and patents will go to.  
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Table 14: R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the EU-27 and China 
  Source: OECD iLibrary, 2013 
Deduced from these results is that Chinese firms could be entering Europe in order to 
acquire assets instead of exploiting them, as the classical FDI theory state. The lack of 
any competitive advantage in high technology and know-how or very few renowned 
international brands, push them to use the strategy of exploiting sectors where the 
western brands have lost importance but have not yet disappeared (Nicolas, 2009). This 
is the case of Geely’s acquisition of Volvo in 2010 or Wolong Holding Group’s 
investment in acquiring Austrian ATB Drive Technology In 2011.  
6.3. Efficiency-seeking 
It is evident that in Western Europe the final purpose is to acquire know-how and 
knowledge, since manufacturing in this location is too expensive. Access to the Western 
European market is also a top priority in order for Chinese firms to remain globally 
competitive, but the competition they encounter makes it not possible for many to strive 
in that environment. The enlargement of the EU gave Chinese firms the opportunity to 
access this large market at a significantly lower cost. In the graph below (table 15) it is 
evident that investments have increased especially since the 2004 EU enlargement and 
in the last years after the crisis.  
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Table 15: Chinese stock value in Eastern Europe, 2004-2010 
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010, MOFCOM 
 The efficiency-seeking motivation is the most recent phenomenon that has taken place 
in Europe and has therefore not received much attention. China is known for being a 
labor-intensive country and its output/hour is very high when compared with other 
major countries such as the US and the EU. However, China is experiencing an increase 
in wages that could replace them as the “manufacture of the world”. Therefore, they 
look outside their home market in order to find an alternative to the increasing cost of 
labor at home in industries that want to internationalize. This would be one of the 
reasons that Dunning proposed: that of taking advantage of the differences in factors of 
endowments in different locations.  
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Table 16: Average wages in Eastern Europe and China, 2001-2010 
Source: Eurostat and China’s Annual Bulletin (2011)3, MOFCOM 
Data from China’s Annual Bulletin and Eurostat reveal that wages in the Asian 
economy are rising faster than those in Eastern Europe (Table 16), which means that in 
the near future the cost advantage may disappear. This is especially true if only coastal 
areas are taken into account, where most of the production and industries are located. 
Eastern Europe, although more expensive in terms of wages, offers other advantages 
that can compensate and counterbalance the increase in Chinese wages. Another 
consulting firm, BearingPoint (2005), calculated that the costs saved from producing in 
Eastern Europe would be 0, 17% less than those in China due to transportation, import 
duties and production costs. This is especially the case in manufacturing industries that 
move from the coastal area of China. 
The Eastern Economies that receive greater Chinese investments are Hungary, Poland 
and Romania (table 17). Although Poland has been leading as the country with most 
OFDI attraction from China, in 2010 Hungary took its place. The eastern country is 
regarded as a hub for Chinese manufacturing multinationals (Filippov & Saebi, 2008), 
with companies such as Lenovo (PC manufacturing investment), Shinco Electronics 
(DVD manufacturing) and ZTE (telecommunications and network solutions) located in 
the region in order to access the Western market more efficiently. Poland is well known 
                                                          
3
 The right vertical axis refers to China in USD, while the left vertical axis refers to Eastern Europe’s in 
millions USD. China’s average wage of employed persons in urban units is taken. For Eastern Europe an 
average of gross wages and salaries is used.  
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for Lenovo’s investment on building a desktop computer factory in 2008 and an order 
processing center (Filippov & Saebi, 2008).  
Table 17: Chinese stock OFDI in the three most attractive Eastern European countries, 2004-
2010 
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010, MOFCOM 
7. Completing the puzzle: Public Chinese OFDI and the role of the 
state 
Chinese overseas investments cannot just be explained with Dunning’s approach, it 
needs to be further developed using institutional theory. Although they have common 
motivations to other economies, they don’t possess the characteristics needed to be 
competitive. Why are some succeeding then? Other emerging countries, which also face 
similar situations, have been recognized as having strong state intervention in their 
economies, and therefore in their investment decisions. First, the state controlled inward 
investments into the country and determined which industries could receive these 
investments in order to follow the program of the government that was established. The 
central priority has been the access to the global market by enterprises to tap into 
technology, know-how and financial resources (Wang, 2002).  
Although the Chinese government has been compared with that of other late 
industrializers in Asia (Lu, Liu & Wang, 2010, Wang, 2002), the fact is that its presence 
has been greater than in the rest. This has made it difficult to analyze the purpose behind 
Chinese firms and fit them into a theoretical framework. New theories like the “strategy 
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tripod”, which integrates the industry dynamics, firm resources and the role of the 
government, has had success in explaining what is so special about Chinese investments 
(Lu, Liu & Wang, 2010). 
In the EU-27, government intervention has varied over time and within sectors with a 
tendency towards a reduction of state interference and a greater role of private firms 
when taking the decision to go abroad (Clegg & Voss., 2012). When looking at the 
different industries that China invested in the EU-27 over USD 100 million, there is a 
difference between the private and public sector (Table 18). The government is 
concentrated on the agricultural, financial and energy sectors revealing that the 
acquisition of resources is still a powerful force behind the decisions of undertaking 
investments outside of China. However, the investments are small compared to other 
developing countries where the resource-seeking motivation is much stronger.  
Regarding the private sector, enterprises concentrate their investments on chemicals, 
transportation (mainly the automotive industry) and real estate. It is notable that both 
private and public enterprises are investing an equal amount in the technological sector, 
although this is not an indicator of a greater concern of the government on seeking 
assets but could rather be a movement towards the service-sector. A representation by 
years is not appropriate in this context, since Chinese investments by the government 
tend not to be consistent (Clegg & Voss., 2012). It is not the interests of the firm that 
drives public investments, but rather the necessity of the nation as a whole. Therefore, 
public investments from year to year will not be consistent with any rational pattern that 
maximizes the benefit of the firm, but rather what provides the nation with what it needs 
in that moment.  
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Table 18:  Industry distribution by ownership of Chinese firm in the EU-27, 2006-2012  
Source: Author’s own calculations using data from Heritage Foundation  
Data by Hanemann & Rosen (2012) shows that government controlled firms do not 
constitute the majority of FDI deals in the EU-27, contrary to what it has been believed 
until now. Private investments, from 2000 to 2011, account for 63% of the total number 
of deals, while government-controlled deals are recorded to be just a 37% (Hanemann & 
Rosen., 2012). When compared to Chinese investments of the 1990s where most of the 
FDI was restricted to the government, we can forecast a movement where commercial 
reasons as the ones studied in the previous section become more important in the future. 
The reason why government driven investments are so important is the value of the 
FDI, which is much greater than that of private firms. The same source recorded that a 
72% of the total investment in USD millions can be attributed to government controlled 
firms, while just a 28% comes from the private sector.  
The influence of government directed investments is not the same across the EU-27, as 
table 19 indicates. Although just investments over USD 100 million are recorded in the 
table, it gives us an indication of the composition of Chinese OFDI. Eastern and 
Northern Europe mainly receive private investment, and is therefore primarily driven by 
commercial motives. As we have seen in previous sections, these are the efficiency-
seeking motivation and the asset-seeking motivation. Southern and Western Europe, on 
the contrary, show indicators of a more diverse FDI where government-owned MNEs 
are more engaged. It is interesting to point out that although government-controlled 
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MNEs are more predominant in Western Europe than in Southern Europe, the value of 
their investments are greater in the latter. 
Table 19: Chinese investments in the EU-27 over USD 100 million, 2006-2012 
 Number of deals (% share) Total Investments USD (% share) 
Government-
controlled 
Private 
Government-
controlled 
Private 
Eastern Europe 0% 100% 0% 100% 
Northern 
Europe 
0% 100% 0% 100% 
Southern 
Europe 
63% 38% 91% 9% 
Western Europe 67% 33% 69% 31% 
Source: Calculations from the author using data from Heritage Foundation 
Government actions are not only important for public enterprises, but also shape the 
decisions of the private sector. Chinese firms responding to the CCIPT survey of 2010 
coincided on the fact that the “go global” policy of the government was one of the most 
decisive factors when investing overseas, indicating that it was governmental policies 
that initiated the recent trend. Furthermore, China is one of the countries that encourage 
overseas investment the most by offering tax incentives and facilitating loans. On figure 
8, we compare how much lending do public financial institutions offer in different 
regions. According to the World Resources Institute (WRI), “Chinese companies obtain 
80-90% of their funding from Chinese banks” (WRI, 2012). None of the great 
economies (Germany, the US, Japan, and the UK) lend an amount that is close to that of 
China. Only BNDES, a Brazilian bank, is approximately at the same level. Both China’s 
export-import bank (Exim Bank) and China’s Development Bank (CDB) are the leaders 
in facilitating mergers and acquisitions and capital flows (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Amount of lending by different public financial institutions, 2010 
Source: WRI, 2012 
8. Case studies 
Previous findings are based on the information collected by previous surveys, but in 
order to offer more reliable results there is a need to evaluate empirical cases that can 
confirm these findings. Due to the limitability of data during the recent period and the 
complexity to access Chinese data, this study will be limited to the analysis of several 
case studies on a selection of Chinese firms that have invested in the EU-27 across 
different industries and regions. Case studies are necessary in order to get a more in-
depth view of the motivations of Chinese MNEs. SOEs do not reveal any information 
about their overseas investment operations and can therefore not be subject to 
exploration in this section. It is present, however, the indirect influence of the state in 
most case studies.  
With this purpose, the four main private enterprises investing in Europe have been 
chosen. Although these organizations do not represent the complete set of private 
enterprises established in Europe, it gives an insight of the kind of investments we may 
see arising from other future Chinese MNEs. It is probable that the pattern of 
investment in the EU-27 will be established by those companies that have a greater 
volume of investment, together with public enterprises. In order to select the following 
companies, the top investments of Chinese corporations in the EU-27 have been chosen 
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with a value over 100 million USD. Together they represent more than 50% of the 
private investment in the EU-27. Privately-owned companies here represented do not 
possess more than 20% of voting shares belonging to the government. To offer the most 
reliable representation possible, these four Chinese MNEs have operations in the four 
regions the EU-27 has been divided into. 
8.1. Zheijang Geely Group  
The automobile industry in China has lagged behind the major economies for a long 
time. Although the government tried to develop the sector already since the 1980s, it 
was not until 2006 that China surpassed Japan and became the largest auto manufacturer 
in the world (Chin, p.1, 2010). In 2009, the Chinese government decided to encourage 
M&A in the automobile industry in order to amplify its capabilities and start being able 
to compete outside the home market. The decision was foster by the heavy influence 
that foreign MNEs had in China’s rise of the industry, and the desire to stop depending 
on them. At the same time, the economic crisis hit hard the automobile sector both in 
the US and in Europe, and sales started to decrease globally. To deal with the increasing 
deficits that the companies were having, they decided to sell unprofitable assets and 
brands (Han & Thomas, 2012). Here we can see the heavy influence of the government 
in deciding the importance of the sector for the “national plan”. 
Volvo is a Swedish automobile manufacturer established in 1927 and then acquired by 
AB Volvo until 1999. After that, it was one of the “Big Three” – Ford – that bought the 
brand. The company is known for its safety and environmental protection, and it enjoys 
a high reputation of quality in all Europe, especially in the Northern area. Its technology 
is well-known around the world and it devotes a high percentage of their earnings 
towards R&D, around 600.000 USD, one of the largest in the industry (Volvo, 2012).  
Geely, on the other side, is one of China’s top ten automobile manufacturers (Figure 9) 
which started in 1997. It has done other minor investments in Europe previous to Volvo 
like the largest British cab maker in the UK, Manganese Bronze. However, the 
acquisition of Volvo has been recorded as the largest cross-border acquisition of a 
Chinese company and the first wholly-owned by any Chinese car manufacturer.  
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Figure 9: Chinese auto companies ranking on car sales, 2009 
Source: Han & Thomas (2012) collected from China Auto Industry Association 
The acquisition had a lot of critiques and many doubted that there would be any positive 
impact for Volvo. Geely was a relatively small company that had no help from the state 
in the beginning and no truly international experience. They lacked, as well, particular 
capabilities that would give them advantage in the European market. The company was 
known for making low-cost products that could be sold for a broad segment. Its strategy 
changed during the 21
st
 century and decided in 2007 to focus on delivering cars that 
targeted a more narrow group, that of the luxury segment. The skills and technology 
needed was not in the home market, so they needed to go abroad and acquire it 
artificially instead of waiting to develop it internally. The company represents the case 
of a latecomer that needs to upgrade itself as fast as possible rather than developing the 
needed skills at home. 
The acquisition made by Geely had a very clear goal: to absorb the technology that 
Volvo is known for, and as a second strategy to increase the value of their brand (after 
the acquisition, Geely appeared in the Fortune 500). It can also use economies of scale 
with the enlargement of the number of factories and plants that are producing cars. 
Geely was planning on building a new facility in Beijing to expand production to 
300.000 units annually and the R&D center to be open in Gothenburg at the end of 2013 
will also contribute while cutting costs of testing and sourcing (Geely 2012).  
Nevertheless, this acquisition is not only positive for Geely as the managers thought in 
the very beginning. It has been proved that sales of Volvo in the Chinese market have 
increased in the luxury segment and it has been able to register a profit since the crisis 
hit the industry (Figure 10). Volvo was the foreign MNE in China that increased its 
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sales the most, a 55% compared to a 37% for BMW in the second position (Han et 
al.2012).   
Figure 10: Volvo’s global sales, 1999-2011 
Source: Han & Thomas (2012) 
Geely’s case illustrates very well the asset-seeking motivation concentrated in Northern 
Europe, where acquiring a western brand could deliver know-how and brand value. The 
peculiarity here is that the Chinese MNE was not concentrated on remaining 
competitive abroad but rather on boosting its presence in the home market. The 
presence of the state was not very predominant in this case. 
8.2. Huawei 
Huawei is a privately held Chinese company established in 1988 with the purpose of 
serving people who had no means to access technology. Its core business is fixed and 
wireless networks, but also offers global services and software (Huawei homepage). 
The company has therefore been growing at the same time as the communication sector 
in the country, which was fueled by the government after the opening up policies in the 
80s. Although it received some help from the government to be able to finance itself at 
the beginning, the company has thereafter been successful due to the strategy adopted. 
Nevertheless, the relation it had with the state since the very beginning had a strong 
impact in its possibility to expand in the future.  
The internationalization of Huawei has not been as the other Chinese MNEs, but the 
results are strong. After starting to impose its market presence in developing countries 
and gain market share by offering good quality and low-cost services, it moved to 
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developed countries. In Europe, it has invested billions of USD across the region 
establishing two regional offices to serve the whole region, forty one legal entities in 
order to access the customers easily and ten R&D centers. Huawei started with a low-
cost advantage in the field, but this was observed not to be sustainable when competing 
with the large MNEs in an industry where quality and change are the most important 
assets.  
It is therefore Huawei started to concentrate on its, nowadays, core advantage: R&D. 
The company is one of the leaders in its industry in the home market when it comes to 
R&D expenditure as a percentage of revenue. From 2010 to 2011 alone, it increased a 
34, 2% (Huawei’s annual report, 2011). Furthermore, 44% of its employees worldwide 
are dedicated to R&D solutions with 23 research centers all around the world. In Europe 
an 11% of the total number of employees is dedicated to this field, which is a large 
figure for an emerging MNE. It is also known for being at the top of the world’s patent 
application (Nakai & Tanaka 2010), surpassing that of Ericsson in 2006 (figure 11). 
From all these patents, 20% of the ones granted are innovation patents. It could be said 
that the advantage it had in innovation at home, combined with its low-cost service was 
the main competitive advantage that guarantees its success in OFDI. 
Figure 11: Number of patent applications by major telecom equipment manufacturers, 1990-
2008  
Source: Nakai & Tanaka, 2010 
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As it was stated in the previous section, the northern part of Europe is more advanced in 
R&D expenditure, which explains the preference of Huawei in locating these activities 
in Sweden. Western Europe has also received large investments from Huawei, 
especially Germany and France, although Italy in the south has also played its role 
(Huawei’s homepage). Despite China remaining its main market, sales revenues in the 
last years increased more overseas than in the home market (Huawei’s annual report, 
2011), revealing how global the company is becoming.  
In order to be able to compete globally and to deter its main competitors in the home 
market, Huawei has established a strategy for its R&D. The idea of internationalizing 
R&D is that it will bring innovative ideas to the marketing and production departments 
at the same time. By investing in different R&D centers abroad and making alliances 
with big multinational corporations, they can update the latest technologies abroad and 
then bring it to the local manufacturing sites to adapt it to the customers and gain 
market share. It can be understood as a way of getting faster along the learning curve 
and possess the advantages and technological assets in a shorter period of time, not 
possible in the home market because of restrictions. The asset-seeking motivation is 
here also the strongest driver of OFDI, but not the only one. The company has also 
established a manufacturing center in Hungary in 2011 in order to serve the region more 
efficiently, having access to the most advanced parts of Europe but located in an area 
where salaries are much lower than in Western Europe. This complies with the 
efficiency-seeking motivation that was analyzed before. 
8.3. Lenovo 
Lenovo is another Chinese brand that is using its strategy to become international. The 
brand was established in 1985 in Beijing, and today is the largest personal computer 
(PC) vendor in China. It is considered to be the pioneer of the science and technology 
sector in the Chinese market (Ahrens & Zhou, 2013), and its main purpose was not to 
sell high-technology products but to increase the revenue in the IT market. Although it 
received help from the government at the beginning, Lenovo is today a private company 
that is registered in Hong Kong’s exchange market. As for Huawei, state support was 
important for the initial support when the company did not have any strong competitive 
advantage. 
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Although it still relies very heavily in China, where it has the largest market share, the 
company has expressed its desire to become global and expand overseas. In the last 
financial year, Lenovo increased its market share in mature markets and expects to 
continue in this direction in order to catch-up with the larger PC makers. The company 
is using a strategy called “protect and attack”, which consists in protecting its market 
share in the regions it has already established and gaining share in those that have 
potential.  
Figure 12: Revenue by geography, % 
Source: Lenovo’s annual report (2012) 
With this strategy in mind, Lenovo started a strategic alliance with IBM in 2005 and has 
recently made a new acquisition of 80% of the stake in Western Europe of Medion, a 
German company that specializes in low-cost computers and other electronic devices. 
The idea of the CEO is to find “high-growth” businesses that can boost the profit of the 
company (Bloomberg, 2013) and for the name of the brand to become known 
worldwide. Germany is currently Europe’s largest PC market, and the acquisition helps 
them to diversify their strength to other products they were not so strong with in Europe 
by getting a new distribution network and an established brand (Hille & Kwong, 2011). 
The result appears to have had a positive effect since the company had in 2012 a record 
increase in its market share (Figure 12) and managed to maintain 8, 7 % share of the 
mature market when the rest of companies were seeing it decline (Ahrens & Zhou, 
2013). What this indicates it’s a market-seeking strategy with an emphasis on the 
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Western European market, together with a secondary motivation of seeking assets such 
as a stronger brand name.   
The investment of R&D, compared with other leading brands such as HP or Dell, is not 
very large. In 2011 it spent a mere 8, 7 % of what HP, the leader in this field, spent. 
Furthermore, all of its R&D centers are established in China instead of 
internationalizing it as other firms are doing in order to become international (Lenovo’s 
annual report 2011). It is therefore clear that they are not looking for technologies or 
innovation overseas but they prefer to keep this area in the home market. The company 
has grown with establishing their presence and targeting a particular segment: low-cost 
computers with a reasonable quality. In this particular case we can see again that it is 
the low-cost advantage that allowed the company to start its oversea expansion. 
 It is expected that Lenovo will continue to acquire more consolidated companies, and 
Europe has potential of being one of these markets. With a high GDP per capita, Europe 
has the potential of offering a profit margin that is higher than emerging countries. Both 
HP and Dell are more concentrated in mature markets and have a greater margin than 
Lenovo as we can see on table 20, which is one driver for Lenovo to gain market share 
in Europe and starting in Germany. 
Table 20: Gross Profit Margin of the biggest PC makers in percentage, 2008-2011 
Source: Modified table from Ahrens & Zhou (2013). Data obtained from firms’ annual 
reports 
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Hille & Kwong (2011) revealed that Lenovo stated an increase of its market share in 
Germany after the acquisition to a 14%. The increase in revenue in mature markets in 
2012 supports the search of Lenovo of a broader consumer base in Europe; therefore it 
is expected to see a rising gross profit margin in the following years. With the 
acquisition of Medion, the back-end of Lenovo (cheap manufacturing and a strong 
supply chain) is combined with the front-end of the western firm (marketing, sales and 
retail). 
8.4. Haier 
Haier group was established as a collective-owned enterprise in Quingdao in 1984. It is 
specialized in white household appliances, and specialized in the Chinese market at the 
beginning. Having conquered its home market, where it currently possesses 25% of the 
market share (Financial Times, 2012), it decided in 1995 to go international and start 
growing abroad (Liu & Li, 2002). The same as the other cases, the company was a 
leader in its sector back in China, which gave them an additional advantage and support 
from the state when moving abroad. Additionally, the CEO is a member of the 
Communist Party which means that although it is not government-controlled, it has a 
greater support from the state than other private MNEs. 
The strategy of Haier does not resemble that of the majority of developing MNEs. 
Instead of targeting developing economies to grow and then enter the developed 
markets when it already has established its position, the company position itself in the 
developed countries where they face the toughest composition and then try to enter 
developing countries (Liu & Li, 2002). It did so by first targeting certain niche markets 
in the U.S. and now they are trying to find a place in the European market (Figure 13). 
This is similar to what Japanese MNEs tried to achieve when internationalizing: they 
started to expand in a few developing countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia in 
1996, in order to enlarge its sales and gain experience (Liu & Li, 2002), and then they 
established themselves in the US market. However, Haier does not bring the 
technological capability with it from the home market, but try to build it up in 
industrialized countries.  
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Figure 13: Path of Haier’s international expansion 
Source: Liu & Li, 2002 
Haier received a lot of support from the government through financial incentives and it 
was intended to become a “Fortune 500” company (Liu & Li, 2002). Its main objective 
is to become a well-known brand and defeat the conventional thinking of relating 
Chinese brands to low-cost products. The name does already not resemble Chinese, and 
this gave them competitive advantage when establishing in the US, where 30% of the 
households have some of its products at home (Financial Times, 2012). It is currently 
the “world’s leading appliance maker by sales and volume” (Financial Times, 2012). 
All indicates towards an asset-seeking and market-seeking strategy. It tries to impose its 
presence first in the developing countries and then moves to the developed regions in 
order to further develop its management and technical knowledge as well as tapping the 
market. 
The market for large kitchen appliances has its biggest market in the EU, and it is 
therefore very important for Haier to access this market. Two of the largest kitchen 
appliance manufacturers come from the EU-27: Electrolux and Bosch-Siemens (Bell, 
p.145, 2008), but Haier has been building up its position since then. Nevertheless, the 
company is still far away from its main competitors despite having doubled its sales in 
the European markets in the last six years; they remain with a position of 1% of the 
market (Financial Times, 2012). Key to the success of the company is the usage of local 
distributors instead of the establishment of own marketing companies, making it more 
difficult for consumers to realize the origin of the brand (Liu & Li, 2002). Haier entered 
the European market at the end of the 1990s, and has expanded its operations in the 
region since then. In the table below (Table 21) we can observe the different 
investments of Haier into the EU-27 along time.  
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Table 21: Investments of Haier in the EU-27, 1997-2004 
Year Country Institutional mode Products 
1997 Germany, 
Netherlands, Italy  
Export Refrigerator 
2000 Italy Greenfield Refrigerator, air-
conditioner 
2001 Italy M&A Refrigerator 
2002 Italy Greenfield Air conditioner 
2002 Spain Greenfield Air conditioner 
2003 Germany Alliance Refrigerator, 
Freezer 
2003 UK Greenfield Air conditioner 
2004 France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain 
Greenfield TV, Mobile phone 
2004 Italy, Germany  Greenfield TV, Mobile phone 
Source: Bell, p.163, 2008 
There is a clear tendency for the company to concentrate its operations in South and 
Western Europe, not investing a lot either in Northern or Eastern Europe although they 
have revealed some intentions of doing so in the latter in order to access the western 
market but at a lower cost (Bell, p. 165, 2008). This pattern has to do with the 
motivation behind the company’s investment policy: building a strong brand in Europe 
in order to gain access to the market and then expand abroad. The company distributes 
its investments according to which part of their value chain they want to enhance, 
establishing design and R&D centers in Italy and Germany respectively, and 
establishing local offices where the market for their products is greater. 
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R&D is not the focus of the company when deciding to go overseas, being very 
dependent on foreign knowledge, so it cannot be used as a competitive advantage. In 
order to enter developed markets, they focus on segments that local brands are not 
targeting: low costumer segments. However, they have realized that to become “truly 
global” they need to address higher customer segments in Europe.   
9. Conclusion 
The division of the world has changed since the FDI economic theories were developed, 
and where industrial countries used to have a dominant position, developing countries 
are taking the lead. In the following study it has been shown how structural changes in 
the latter economies are shifting the trends we observed some decades ago. Regarding 
China, it is following a trend that will probably convert the country in one of the 
greatest investors. Its investments in the EU-27 have increased in the last decade and are 
concentrated in Western and Northern Europe. This does not go in accordance with the 
classical FDI theory, since China is entering the most competitive markets when they 
haven’t developed any competitive advantage to compete with local MNEs. The 
industries they are investing in are very diverse, and most of them concentrate in 
Western Europe. Surprisingly it is the primary and secondary sectors that receive the 
greatest amount, and not so the tertiary as we may think could be the primary interest in 
the EU-27. Nevertheless, this is due to the disproportional weight of SOEs investments’ 
value.  
When compared with other Eastern and South Asian economies that started 
industrializing before China, it is noticeable that they have all started to invest abroad 
while developing without possessing major advantages. However, the rest of NIEs 
concentrated most of their investments in developing countries where they could 
establish themselves and build their competitive strengths, using the first mover 
advantage. Thereafter they also started to invest in developed countries, but at a lower 
scale than China. The Asian giant invested in developed countries from the beginning, 
probably because of their massive need of resources, and although they have increased 
their investments in developing countries, industrialized regions are becoming one of its 
focuses again. Specifically in the EU-27 we can observe a difference with other NIEs. 
The first NIEs did not start to look for assets and markets in the region until the last 
stages of their international expansion, while China has done so very early and has even 
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surpassed the rest. This could be explained by the need of China to compensate the fact 
of being a latecomer and is now aggressively targeting developed markets where they 
can benefit from. The crisis has just made it easier for the country to access a market 
which was very restricted previously, and this has increased its investments so rapidly.  
The motivations of Chinese investments are multiple, and different regions of the EU-
27 respond better to what they are looking for. It must be pointed out that there are 
indicators of Chinese MNEs following the classical theory in the most recent period, 
when private investments started to arise as restrictions from the government were 
removed. Previous surveys have revealed the importance of looking for new markets 
due to the saturation of China’s own home market. GDP per capita reveals that Western 
and Northern Europe are the most probable targets when pursuing these strategies. 
Lenovo’s case reveals how the desire to expand its customer segment drives them to 
acquire a German company and from this starting point, expand its market. Haier also 
has this motivation, but it establishes itself also in Southern Europe due to its larger 
customer base in this sector. Both share the same characteristic: they use their low-cost 
advantage to start establishing themselves and try to establish themselves by acquiring 
brands that are diminishing their importance in Europe but have not yet disappeared.  
Asset-seeking is also an important determinant for Chinese MNEs to go abroad since 
the home country does not spend a great amount of their GDP on R&D expenses. 
Northern Europe, and thereafter Western Europe, appears to be the ideal location for 
these firms, where they can gain the knowledge and then use it to develop their products 
both at home and in other developing regions. In this category we have Huawei and 
Geely fostering their technological knowledge, or Lenovo and Haier trying to upgrade 
their brand image. We could say that it is the most common motivation among private 
enterprises investing in the region, although they have other interests at the same time. 
Interesting, it is also interesting for the government since it is a way of shaping global 
and competitive brands abroad that will enforce China’s role in the global market. 
Therefore, the government offers help to these MNEs. 
Finally, the efficiency-seeking motivation is starting to become more interesting for 
Chinese investors as they see their wages in the coastal area to rise and transportation 
costs to make it expensive to produce in China. With this perspective, Eastern Europe 
offers the best location for firms who want to enter the Western European market while 
maintain the low-cost advantage. Companies such as Huawei and Haier are increasingly 
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relocating their operations to this area to improve their logistic network and reduce their 
costs of operating in the region.  
From the previous analysis, we can state that Chinese OFDI defeats the traditional 
theory in not having developed a FSA to compete in developed markets and having 
increased its presence much faster than other developing nations before it. The only 
feature that makes it possible for China to invest in EU-27 is the low-cost labor, a rather 
CSA which are not contemplated as a strength when going overseas for developed 
nations. They are aggressively trying to gain other competitive advantages in order to be 
able to remain when the low-cost advantage has disappeared. They must do so faster 
than other developing countries because they have industrialized late and today’s world 
is changing more rapid than before. However, we must not forget that Chinese MNEs 
possess another characteristic that makes them different from other countries: the 
support from the government. All enterprises that have been studied in the cases, 
although private, have received support from the government in order to be able to 
internationalize and compete overseas. This is not contemplated in the OLI framework, 
but should be incorporated when developing new FDI theory.  
The role of the government, nevertheless, has decreased with time and the MNEs that 
are entering the EU are more commercially oriented than following a national plan 
design by the central authorities. The presence of SOEs is greater in Western and 
Southern Europe, which explains the great stock accumulation in the former due to their 
large investments. Public enterprises are still present in the energy and financial sector 
in certain regions like Southern and Western Europe, but their role could be supplanted 
in the future with private Chinese MNEs.  
This study indicates that Chinese OFDI in the EU-27 is gradually moving towards the 
classical theory of FDI, but still possesses certain characteristics that deviate from the 
conventional statements. These should be included in future studies, but the classic 
frameworks should be kept. We must recognize, however, the limitations of this study 
since it is restricted to the study of a very particular region in the world. When 
analyzing Chinese OFDI in a wider perspective, we may obtain different results. 
Nevertheless, it is important that this study took place in order to introduce the topic and 
foster future research. Policy recommendations may be formulated according to the 
focus of Chinese investments in different regions of the EU-27, and it can be used as a 
base for both quantitative and qualitative studies.  
 
 
58 
 
References 
Ahrens, N & Zhou, Y. (2013). China’s Competitiveness: Myth, Reality, and Lessons for 
the United States and Japan. Case Study: Lenovo. A Report for the CSIS Hills Program 
on Governance. Available Online: 
http://csis.org/files/publication/130129_competitiveness_Lenovo_casestudy_Web.pdf 
[Accessed 5 May 2013] 
Alon, I., Child, J., Li, S. & McIntyre, J.R. (2011). Globalization of Chinese Firms: 
Theoretical Universalism or Particularism. Management and Organization Review, 
Vol.7, No.2, pp. 191-200 
Armstrong, S. (2011). Assessing the Scale and Potential of Chinese Investment 
Overseas: An Econometric Approach. China & World Economy, Vol.19, no.4 pp.22-37 
BearingPoint (2005). Global Market Expansion: China and Eastern Europe – Success 
Stories. Available Online: 
http://www.gexso.com/material/Global_Market_Expansion.pdf [Accessed 27 April 
2013] 
Bell, S. (2008). 
International Brand Management of Chinese Companies: Case Studies on the 
Chinese Household Appliances and Consumer Electronics Industry Entering US and W
estern European Markets, Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 
Berning, S.C. & Holtbrügge, D. (2012). Chinese outward foreign direct investment—a 
challenge for traditional internationalization theories? Journal fur Betriebswirtschaft, 
v.62, no. 3-4, pp.169-224 
Bloomberg (2013). Lenovo Boosts Profit 60% on Medion, NEC PC Acquisitions. 
Available Online: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-23/lenovo-fourth-quarter-
profit-gains-60-percent-on-acquisitions.html [Accessed 3 May 2013] 
Buckley, P.J., Clegg, L.J., Cross A.R., Liu, X., Voss, H, & Zheng, P. (2007). The 
Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of International 
Business Studies, Vol.38, No.4, pp.499-518 
Cai, K.G. (1999). Outward Foreign Direct Investment: A Novel Dimension of China's 
Integration into the Regional and Global Economy. The China Quarterly, No.160, 
pp.856-880 
 
 
59 
 
Caves, R.E. (1971). International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign 
Investment. Economica, Vol.38, No.149, pp. 1-27 
Child, J. & Rodrigues, S.B. (2005). The Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Case 
for Theoretical Extension? Management and Organization Review, Vol.1, No.3, pp.381-
410 
Chin, G. T. (2010). China’s Automotive Modernization: The Party-State and 
Multinational Corporations, Toronto: Palgravemacmillan  
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (2011). Survey on Current 
Conditions and Intention of Outbound Investment by Chinese Enterprises (2008-2010). 
Available Online: https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2012/10/ccpit-prc-
outboundinvestment.pdf [Accessed 25 April 2013] 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (2010). Survey on Current 
Conditions and Intention of Outbound Investment by Chinese Enterprises. Available 
Online: https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2012/10/ccpit-prc-
outboundinvestment.pdf [Accessed 25 April 2013] 
Clegg, J. & Voss, H. (2012) Europe China Research and Advice Network. Available 
Online: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/0912ecran_clegg
voss.pdf [Accessed 11 March 2013] 
Clegg, J. & Voss, H. (2011). Inside the China–EU FDI Bond. China & World Economy, 
Vol.19, No.4, pp. 92-108 
Cui, L., Jiang, F. & Stening, B.(2011). The Entry-Mode Decision of Chinese Outward 
FDI: Firm Resources, Industry Conditions, and Institutional Forces. Thunderbird 
International Business Review, Vol.53, No.4, pp. 483-499 
Cui, L. & Jiang, F. (2012). State ownership effect on firms’ FDI ownership decisions 
under institutional pressure: a study of Chinese outward-investing firms. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol.43, pp.264-284 
Cui, L. & Jiang, F. (2010). Behind ownership decision of Chinese outward FDI: 
Resources and institutions. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol.27, No.4, pp.751-
774 
 
 
60 
 
Davies, K. (2012). Outward Foreign Direct Investment from China and Its Policy 
Context. China: An International Journal, Vol.10, No.1, pp.51-61 
Deng, P. (2009). Why do Chinese firms tend to acquire strategic assets in international 
expansion? Journal of World Business, Vol.44, No.1, pp.74-84 
Deng, P. (2007). Investing for strategic resources and its rationale: The case of outward 
FDI from Chinese companies, Business Horizons, v.50, pp.71-81 
Duanmu, J. (2012). Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Chinese Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs), Focus on China Special Section, Journal of World Business, v.47, 
no.1, pp. 64-72 
Dunning, J.H. & Lundan, S.M. (2008). Institutions and the OLI paradigm of the 
multinational enterprise. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol.25, No.4, pp.573-
593 
Dunning, J. H. (2006). Towards a new paradigm of development: implications for the 
determinants of international business.  UNCTAD. Available Online: 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20061a7_en.pdf [Accessed 5 May 2013] 
Dunning J.H., Van Hoesel, R. & Narula, R. (1997). Explaining the “New” Wave of 
Outward FDI from Developing Countries: the Case of Taiwan and Korea. Available 
Online: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=57 [Accessed 9 May 2013] 
Dunning, J.H. (1988). The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production: A 
Restatement and Some Possible Extensions. Journal of International Business Studies, 
Vol.19, No.1, pp.1-31 
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (2013). Chinese Outbound 
Investment in the European Union. Available Online: 
http://europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-chinese-outbound-investment-eu-
european-union [Accessed 11 March 2013] 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies (2011). EU-China Trade 
Relations. Available online: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocume
nt=EN&file=48592#search=%20EU%20-%20China%20 [Accessed 11 March 2013] 
 
 
61 
 
Ernst & Young (2012). European attractiveness survey. Available Online: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Attractiveness_2012_europe/$FILE/Attrac
tiveness_2012_europe.pdf [Accessed 7 March 2013] 
Ernst & Young (2011). Beyond Asia: Strategies to support the quest for growth. 
Available Online: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Beyond_Asia:_strategies_to_support_the_
quest_for_growth/$FILE/Beyond%20Asia.pdf [Accessed 28 April 2013] 
Fabre, G. & Grumbach, S. (2012). The World upside down, China’s R&D and 
innovation strategy. Fondation Maison des science d l’homme. Available Online: 
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/68/63/89/PDF/FMSH-WP-2012-07_Fabre-
Grumbach.pdf [Accessed 30 April 2013] 
Filippov, S. & Saebi, T. (2008) Europeanisation Strategy of Chinese Companies: Its 
Perils and Promises, UNU-MERIT Working Papers, The Netherlands: United Nations 
University 
Financial Times (2012). Haier seeks to boost European sales. Available Online: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d0ab49ba-b2b2-11e1-9bd6-00144feabdc0.html 
[Accessed 28 April 2013] 
Fonseca, M., Mendonça, A. & Passos, J. (2007). The Investment Development Path 
Hypothesis: Evidence from the Portuguese Case – A Panel Data Analysis. ISEG, 
Available Online: https://www.repository.utl.pt/bitstream/10400.5/814/1/wp21-2007-
%20de.pdf [Accessed 27 April 2013] 
Franco, C., Rentocchini, F. & Marzetti, G.V. (2008). Why do firms invest abroad? An 
analysis of the motives underlying Foreign Direct Investments. Available Online: 
http://www.unitn.it/files/17_08_vittucci.pdf [Accessed 29 April 2013] 
Gao, T. (2005). Foreign direct investment from developing Asia: some distinctive 
features. Economic Letters, Vol.86, No.1, pp.29-35 
Gavin, B. (2012). China's Expanding Foreign Investment in Europe: New Policies 
Challenges for the EU. European Institute for Asian Studies. Available Online: 
http://www.eias.org/sites/default/files/EIAS_Briefing_Paper_November_2012_BGavin
_Chinese_Investment_in_Europe.pdf [Accessed 8 February 2013] 
 
 
62 
 
Gu, L. & Reed, W. R. (2013), Chinese overseas M&A performance and the Go Global 
policy, Economics of Transition, Vol.21, No.1, pp.157-192 
Gugler, P. & Boie, B. (2008). The Emergence of Chinese FDI: Determinants and 
Strategies of Chinese MNEs. Available Online: 
http://gdex.dk/ofdi/20%20Gugler%20Philippe.pdf [Accessed 11 April 2013] 
Han, C. & Thomas, S.R. (2012), Why are China’s companies doing overseas M&As? 
The case of Geely and Volvo, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Vol.2, No.8, pp.1-7  
Hanemann, T. (2013). Chinese Investment: Europe vs. the United States. Rhodium 
Group. Available Online: http://rhg.com/notes/chinese-investment-europe-vs-the-
united-states [Accessed 22 April 2013] 
Hanemann, T. & Rosen, D.H. (2012). China Invests In Europe: Patterns, Impacts and 
Policy Implications. Rhodium Group. Available Online: http://rhg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/RHG_ChinaInvestsInEurope_June2012_ExecutiveSummary.p
df [Accessed 11 December 2012] 
Hille, K. & Kwong, R. (2011). Lenovo buys Medion to bolster Europe profile. Financial 
Times. Available Online: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/73fcf1cc-8c53-11e0-b1c8-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2UuHh7oHT [Accessed 3 March 2013] 
Huawei (2013). Huawei’s Homepage. Available Online: http://www.huawei.com/en/ 
[Accessed 3 May 2013] 
Huawei (2011). Huawei’s Annual Report 2011. Available Online: 
http://www.huawei.com/ucmf/groups/public/documents/attachments/hw_126991.pdf 
[Accessed 3 May 2013] 
Hurst, L. (2011). Comparative Analysis of the Determinants of China’s State-owned 
Outward Direct Investment in OECD and Non-OECD Countries. China & World 
Economy, Vol.19, No.4, pp. 74-91 
Hymer, S.H. (1960). The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct 
Foreign Investment. Available Online: 
http://teaching.ust.hk/~mgto650p/meyer/readings/1/01_Hymer.pdf [Accessed Online: 
28 April 2013]Kolstad, I. & Wiig, A. (2012). What determines Chinese outward FDI? 
Focus on China Special Section, Journal of World Business, v.47, no. 1, pp.26-34 
 
 
63 
 
Johnson, A. (2006). The Effects of FDI Inflows on Host Country Economic Growth. 
Electronic Working Paper Series, No.58, The Royal Institute of Technology 
Lau, C., Ngo, H. & Yiu, D. W. (2010). Internationalization and organizational resources 
of Chinese firms. Chinese Management Studies, Vol.4, No. 3, pp.258-272 
Lenovo (2013). Lenovo’s Annual Report 2011-12. Available Online: 
http://www.lenovo.com/ww/lenovo/pdf/report/E_099220120531d.pdf  [Accessed 4 May 
2013] 
Liu, H. & Li, K. (2002). Strategic Implications of Emerging Chinese Multinationals: 
The Haier Case Study. European Management Journal, Vol.20, No.6, pp.609-706 
Luo, Y. & Tung, R.L. (2007). International Expansion of Emerging Market Enterprises: 
A Springboard Perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol.38, No.4, 
pp.481-498 
Lu, J., Liu, X. & Wang, H. (2010). Motives for Outward FDI of Chinese Private Firms: 
Firm Resources, Industry Dynamics, and Government Policies. Management and 
Organization Review, Vol. 7, No.2, pp.223-248 
Minin, A., Zhang, J. & Gammeltoft P. (2012). Chinese foreign direct investment in 
R&D in Europe: A new model of R&D internationalization? European Management 
Journal, Vol.30, pp. 189-203 
Matthew, J.A. (2006). Dragon multinationals: New players in 21st century globalization. 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol.23, No.1, pp.5-27 
MOFCOM (2010). 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment. Available Online: 
http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/hzs/accessory/201109/1316069658609.pdf [Accessed 11 
December 2012] 
Morck, R., Yeung, B. & Zhao, M. (2008). The Industrial Economics of Foreign 
Investment. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol.39, No.3, pp.337-350 
Nakai, Y. & Tanaka Y. (2010). Chinese Company’s IPR Strategy: How Huawei 
Technologies Succeeded in Dominating Overseas Market by Sideward-Crawl Crab 
Strategy. PICMET. Available Online: 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5602172&url=http%3A%2F%2
Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fxpls%2Fabs_all.jsp%3Farnumber%3D5602172 
 
 
64 
 
[Accessed 3 May 2013] 
Nicolas, F. (2009). Chinese Direct Investment in Europe: Facts and Fallacies. Chatham 
House, Briefing Paper. Available Online: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Econ
omics/0609ch_odi.pdf [Accessed 11 March 2013] 
Nicolas, F. & Thomsen S. (2008). The Rise of Chinese Firms in Europe: Motives, 
Strategies and Implications, Draft Paper at the Asia Pacific Association Conference. 
Available Online: http://www.apeaweb.org/confer/bei08/papers/nicolas.pdf [Accessed 
11 March 2013] 
Ning, L. (2009). China’s Leadership in the World ICT Industry: A Successful Story of 
Its “Attracting-In” and “Walking-Out” Strategy for the Development of High-Tech 
industries? Pacific Affairs, Vol.82, No.1, pp.67-91 
OECD (2008). China’s Outward Direct Investment in OECD (eds), OECD Investment 
Policy Reviews: China 2008: Encouraging Responsible Business Conduct, OECD 
publishing, pp.65-142. Available Online: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-
investment/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-china-2008_9789264053717-en [Accessed 
23 April 2013] 
Ozawa, T. (2007). Professor Kiyoshi Kojima’s Contributions to FDI Theory: Trade, 
Structural Transformation, Growth, and Integration in East Asia. Center on Japanese 
Economy and Business, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. Available 
Online: http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:108870 [Accessed 27 April 
2013] 
Peng, M.W., Wang D.Y.L. & Jiang Y. (2008).  An Institution-Based View of International 
Business Strategy: A Focus on Emerging Economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 
Vol.39, No.5, pp.920-936 
Rios-Morales, R. & Brennan, L. (2010). The emergence of Chinese investment in 
Europe. EuroMed Journal of Business, Vol.4, No.2, pp.215-231 
Rodriguez, C. & Bustillo, R. (2011). A Critical Revision of the Empirical Literature on 
Chinese Outward Investment: A New Proposal. Panoeconomicus, Vol.5, Special issue, 
pp.715-733 
 
 
65 
 
Rosen, D.H. & Hanemann, T. (2009). China’s Changing Outbound Foreign Direct 
Investment Profile: Drivers and Policy Implications. Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. Available Online: http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb09-14.pdf 
[Accessed 9 February 2013] 
Rugman, A. & Li, J. (2007). Will China’s Multinationals Succeed Globally or 
Regionally? European Management Journal, v.25, no.5, pp.333-343  
Sutherland, D. (2009). Do China’s “national team” business groups undertake strategic-
asset-seeking OFDI? Chinese Management Studies, Vol.3, No.1, pp.11-24 
Schüler-Zhou, Y. & Schüller, M. (2009). The internationalization of Chinese 
companies: What do official statistics tell us about Chinese outward foreign direct 
investment? Chinese Mangement Studies, Vol.3, No.1, pp.25-42 
The Economist (2012). Pedalling prosperity.  Available Online: 
http://www.economist.com/node/21555762 [Accessed 13 April 2013] 
Thorbecke, W. & Salike, N. (2011). Understanding Foreign Direct Investment in East 
Asia. ADBI Working Paper Series, No.290. Available Online: 
http://www.adbi.org/files/2011.06.23.wp290.foreign.direct.investment.east.asia.pdf 
[Accessed 24 May 2013] 
UNCTAD, (2012). World Investment Report 2012. Available Online: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012_embargoed_en.pdf [Accessed 6 
March 2013]  
Vasyechko, O. (2012). A Review of FDI Theories: An Application for Transition 
Economies. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Issue 89, 
pp.118-137 
Volvo Group Global (2012). Volvo Group Annual Report 2012. Available Online: 
http://www3.volvo.com/investors/finrep/ar12/ar_2012_eng.pdf [Accessed 1 May 2013] 
Wang, M.Y. (2002). The Motivations behind China's Government-Initiated Industrial 
Investments Overseas. Pacific Affairs, Vol.75, No.2, pp.187-206 
Wei, Z. (2010). The Literature on Chinese Outward FDI. Multinational Business 
Review, Vol.18, No.3, pp.73-112 
 
 
66 
 
World Resource Institute (2012). A Closer Look At China’s Overseas Investment. 
Available Online: http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/12/closer-look-chinas-overseas-
investment [Accessed 13 April 2013] 
Yiu, D.W. (2010). Multinational Advantages of Chinese Business Groups: A 
Theoretical Exploration. Management and Organization Review, Vol.7, No.2, pp.249-
277 
Zhang, K.H. (2009). Rise of Chinese Multinational Firms. The Chinese Economy, 
Vol.42, No.6, pp.81-96 
more_184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  _23, 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
